@ARTICLE{Melhem_Mutaz_Y._Generalized_2019,
 author={Melhem, Mutaz Y. and Kish, Laszlo B.},
 volume={vol. 26},
 number={No 4},
 journal={Metrology and Measurement Systems},
 pages={607-616},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2019},
 publisher={Polish Academy of Sciences Committee on Metrology and Scientific Instrumentation},
 abstract={A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system is studied with unknown parasitic DC-voltage sources at both Alice’s and Bob’s ends. This paper is the generalization of our earlier investigation with a single-end parasitic source. Under the assumption that Eve does not know the values of the parasitic sources, a new attack, utilizing the current generated by the parasitic dc-voltage sources, is introduced. The attack is mathematically analyzed and demonstrated by computer simulations. Simple defense methods against the attack are shown. The earlier defense method based solely on the comparison of current/voltage data at Alice’s and Bob’s terminals is useless here since the wire currents and voltages are equal at both ends. However, the more expensive version of the earlier defense method, which is based on in-situ system simulation and comparison with measurements, works efficiently.},
 type={Article},
 title={Generalized DC loop current attack against the KLJN secure key exchange scheme},
 URL={http://ochroma.man.poznan.pl/Content/114024/PDF/02_MMS_4_INTERNET.pdf},
 doi={10.24425/mms.2019.130571},
 keywords={unconditional security, secure key exchange, parasitic loop currents and voltages, information leak},
}