@ARTICLE{Machcewicz-Grad_Agata_Akrasia_2020,
 author={Machcewicz-Grad, Agata},
 number={No 1},
 journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria},
 pages={211-233},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2020},
 publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN},
 publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego},
 abstract={Akratic actions are usually defined as intentional actions which conflict with the agent’s best judgement. As both irrational and conscious, actions of that type stand in need of an explanation. In this paper I reconstruct and criticize Donald Davidson’s classical standpoint on the problem of akrasia. I show the disadvantages of Davidsonian conception of practical reasoning and I defend the conception of syllogistic reasoning. I also criticize the theory of intention as unconditional normative judgement. Against Davidson’s view, I argue for the theory of intention as an act of will (not a judgement). According to this theory of intention and practical reasoning, akratic actions should be explained as actions caused by an act of will which conflicts with the best judgement. I propose to interpret the inclination of will to conflict or to follow the best judgement by the theory of habitus.},
 type={Artykuły / Articles},
 title={Akrasia as dysfunction of will. Critical analysis of D. Davidson’s conception of weakness of will and an outline of alternative solution},
 URL={http://ochroma.man.poznan.pl/Content/116194/PDF/2020-01-PFIL-14-Machcewicz-Grad.pdf},
 doi={10.24425/pfns.2020.132979},
 keywords={akrasia, weakness of will, practical reasoning, intention, irrational actions, habitus, D. Davidson, Thomas Aquinas},
}