@ARTICLE{Raźniak_Maciej_The,
 author={Raźniak, Maciej},
 number={No 1},
 pages={104-124},
 journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria},
 howpublished={online},
 publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN},
 publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego},
 abstract={The paper discusses the relationship between the concept of the conical present, originally proposed by William Godfrey‑Smith, and the paradox of causality, commonly considered to be its main problem. This paradox can be summarized as follows. It is well known that our observational cognition is reducible to causal relations. Therefore, if we agree with Godfrey‑Smith, and recognize an event to be present in relation to another event iff the first one is observable from the standpoint of the second, then both can be causally interconnected and at present. At this point, it becomes clear that the concept of the conical present admits the possibility that events are temporally separated from each other but can yet remain at present. This, however, goes against our intuitions and leads to a paradox if we want to sustain the view that the cause always precedes the effect. The aim of the article is to show that the paradox of causality faces several difficulties that weaken its strength. The text proposes two strategies to dismiss this objection. Each of them justifies the claim that, at least, a partial defense of the concept of conical present is possible. The first strategy leads to the conclusion that it is not fair to abandon the concept of conical present because of the paradox of causality, since the concept of the present defined in Classical Mechanics is also subject to this paradox. The second strategy is to show that the consequences of the conical present are not as counterintuitive as the opponents of this view claim, because the strength of this objection depends on how we understand the causality of events.},
 title={The Conical Present and the Paradox of Causality},
 type={Artykuł},
 URL={http://ochroma.man.poznan.pl/Content/134662/2024-01-PFIL-05.pdf},
 doi={10.24425/pfns.2024.150955},
 keywords={light cone, Minkowski space‑time, ontology, philosophy of physics, philosophy of time, special relativity},
}