Bills of Lading are transferable documents of title and the transfer of document results in the transfer of the rights incorporated in it. Some of B/L are additionally negotiable. However the legal meaning of these two terms isn’t the same what is not respected in practice. Historically there is also a difference in legal grounds and scope of rights represented and transferred by negotiable bills of lading according to British, American and continental law. An important role in this differentiation was played by the doctrine of privity of contract. This ultimately affects the legal position and scope of the acquired rights of legitimate holders of bills of lading, which are considered to be “negotiable”, including the right to obtain claims from the carrier for cargo damage.
The article discusses the rules for judicial proceedings in cases for the establishment and distribution of a fund for limiting liability for maritime claims as they are set out in the Maritime Code and the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC 1996). The author presented the basic convention principles regarding the constitution of the fund and related effects as well as the issue of their interpretation and application in national law of selected countries parties of the convention. The article discusses the regulation of the main stages of the fund proceeding in the Polish civil procedure.
In its history, Poland was usually more oriented to land than to the sea. For many centuries we have not been able to see the opportunities and potential created by the coastal location of our country. In the current strategic documents in Poland, there are also no proper references to the maritime security of the state, although we are a member of both NATO and the European Union. The article presents the creation process in 2015–2017 and the content of a unique document devoted to this issue: Poland’s Strategic Concept for Maritime Security, which was born thanks to the efforts of “enthusiasts” of maritime affairs from the Naval Academy, Shipbuilding Council and the Institute of General Józef Haller under the leadership of the National Security Bureau. In the authors opinion, the document is to form the basis for work on the future maritime security strategy of our country, and also become the “engine” of public discussion in Poland on maritime security issues and the effective use of the coastal position of the state for economic development.
Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks came into force on 14th April 2015 and has been ratified by now by over 40 states across the world (among them Australia, China, India, South Africa and most of the EU countries). The convention provides legal framework for action taken by the Coastal States aiming at removal of wrecks posing danger or impediment to navigation, as well as to the marine environment, or damage to the coastline or related interests of one or more States.
The Convention fills the existing legal gap by enabling the States to remove wrecks beyond their territories (as well as within if States decide so). Beside the existing international regulations like Intervention Convention or UNCLOS, the Nairobi Convention clarifies the Costal State’s rights to remove wrecks from its EEZ if they pose a danger for safe navigation or marine environment. The Convention corresponds with mentioned conventions but also equips Coastal States with new legal instruments to deal with hazardous wrecks beyond their territory. The aim of the paper is to analyse the new rights and duties of states, as well as scope of the notion of navigational and environmental threats causes by wrecks. It will refer also to regulatory problems faced by the states implementing the Convention. Even if the Convention is to be applied to territorial sea, its multiple provisions are not. Moreover, the Convention leaves many important aspects unregulated. Those issues will be analysed from the perspective of a country which has not yet ratified the Convention, and will be confronted with the experience from other jurisdictions.
The high and rapidly increasing demand for maritime space for various purposes, such as: shipping and fishing, production of energy from renewable sources, oil and gas exploitation, environmental conservation, tourism and aquaculture, as well as the multiple pressures on coastal resources, require integrated planning and management approach. In the law of the European Union, maritime governance has been developed in the Integrated Maritime Policy. The aim of this article is to show maritime spatial planning as a tool that enables public authorities to apply an integrated and trans-boundary approach.
The main aim of the maritime spatial planning is to promote sustainable development and growth in the maritime sector, applying an ecosystem-based approach, and to achieve the coexistence of relevant activities and uses. In order to achieve that purpose, Member States should ensure that the planning process results in a comprehensive planning taking into consideration inter alia long-term changes due to climate change.
The goal of the article is the description and analyze of the exclusions of the maritime carrier’s liability, regulated in international conventions, known as the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules. Their construction is basically different and indicates, that their creators had quite the opposite approach in the way of regulation of the negative scope of maritime carrier’s liability.
In the article it has been compared each exclusion of liability in both conventions, especially with the consideration of the genuine differences with the carrier’s scope of liability. It has been analyzed the examples of the real cases, that have been ruled on the grounds of the maritime carrier’s liability. It has been also take a try to evaluate if the court’s sentence would be the same on the grounds of both conventions, or rather would be different.
The meaning and scope of the concept of security in extenso, as well as its special type, i.e. maritime safety and security, has been the subject of many considerations and discussions for decades, and perhaps for centuries. Security is most often understood as one of the basic functions of the State implying counteracting all threats. In axiological terms, as a risk-free state, maritime safety is a value, and in functional terms, as a desirable state, it is expressed in the protective function of law. The law must be structured in such a way as to constantly realize this function. Achieving maritime safety can therefore be seen as the capacity of law and institutions, for example, to protect a ship against loss, protect health and life of people employed on a ship, and protect the environment from pollution.
en
pl
