Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

The author discusses systematization of scientific disciplines. He presents two methods of systematization, namely: classification which uses logical divisions, and typologization which relies on Weberian method of defining ideal types. Faced with certain weaknesses of the classification and typologization, the author proposes still another method of science systematization, which he calls ‘theoretical positioning’. Such systematization is accomplished by defining a selected theory with respect to the research processes employed in it. At the time when interdisciplinary studies are becoming more and more popular, theoretical positioning is a useful method of systematization for research purposes. It arranges scientific disciplines in an order that displays their theoretical affinities. That method of systematization not only organizes the multitude of scientific disciplines but also indicates which areas of cooperation can be most promising. Alongside that study, the author also discusses the possibility of theoretical positioning of sciences by employing conceptual categories used in theory of action which, appropriately conceptualized, could serve as effective interdisciplinary instruments.

The paper aims at locating argumentation schemes with hidden premises derived from shared cultural knowledge ( topoi) within philosophical models of communication and discourse referring to inference and argumentation (Robert B. Brandom’s semantic argumentation and related theories, Jean‑Claude Anscombre and Oswald Ducrot’s theory of argumentation‑in‑language). These models enable comparison of argumentation and topics with other inferential mechanisms that underlie communication. A solution for the problem of mutual knowledge, relevant from the viewpoint of topics, is scrutinised from psychologically‑ and sociologically‑oriented perspectives.

The mathematical connections between microscale and macroscale models of a given piece of physical reality (compare e.g., statistical mechanics with thermodynamics) justify the following correlation thesis: a small change of value of a microscopic parameter (e.g. a change of number of molecules in a given volume of ideal gas) is correlated with a change of value of the associated macroscopic parameter (e.g. a change of temperature of ideal gas). The thesis stands in contradiction to one of the two premises in the sorites paradox, called here the condition of small change (cf. Paul Égré’s ‘tolerance principle’), according to which a small change of value of a microscopic parameter has negligible impact on a change of value of a corresponding macroscopic parameter. Acceptance of the correlation thesis results in a waiving of the condition of small change, and consequently provides a solution of the paradox. The correlation thesis coincides with Bertrand Russell’s view expressed in Vagueness (1923) where he argues that that vagueness in the macroscopic parameter is not of an ontological nature but only of an epistemological character, and is caused by looking at the physical system from a far-away perspective. This inexact picture results in an acquiescence with the inexact conditions that determine the impact of a small ontic change on its representation by the macroscopic ontic parameter. The macroscopic parameter is partly governed by its own conditions, according to the correlation thesis.

In the broad spectrum of Bertrand Russell’s interests the socio‑political issues had a special role. The possibility of peaceful global co‑existence was most important to him. Occasionally he took part in the disputes between West and East accepting the role of a mediator. He saw a chance for peace in the creation of a world government. Kant had proposed a similar project of a supranational community and hoped it could result in the emergence of a global society, embracing all nations. With this achievement in place, the project of ‘eternal peace’ could be completed, he hoped. In this way, relying on ethical and legal principles, Kant designed a permanent international peace alliance.

In his book Mortal Questions (1979) Thomas Nagel discusses four practical moral issues: (1) fear of death, (2) the absurdity of human life, (3) sexual perversion and (4) military massacre. His primary concern is neither to justify moral opprobrium nor to find an appropriate punishment for the culprits. Instead, he wants to clarify motives of those individuals who are not afraid of death, who can deal resolutely with the pointlessness of human life, who are not deeply dismayed by the crudity of some forms of sexual behavior or who refuse to justify whatever forms of military atrocities with higher purposes. He reviews various cases of excessive or deficient moral sensitivity and offers specific, case‑oriented advice on how to deal with them. Nagel favors self‑persuasion in cases of fear of death and argues that the sense of absurd is not much different from skepticism. He proposes to draw a line between private and public aspects of sexual behavior and supports dual evaluation of military activities by distinguishing between the moral value of an act and the moral value of the motives of the actor. He condones no atrocities. These arguments do not add up to constitute a form of moral relativism but, instead, seem to restore intellectual respectability of casuistry.

The article presents a phenomenological description of existential experience, one of the fundamental issues in the philosophy of existence. At the outset, it is worth emphasizing that showing the specifics of this experience seems to be a difficult, or even an impossible task – due to its individual, subjective and inexpressible nature, and, as a consequence, its elimination from the academic, schematic, scientific reflection. The problem of existential experience is so interesting, however, and philosophically so important that – despite those disheartening limitations – it seems worthwhile to take a closer look at it. The article shows the phenomenon of human existence in the context of its intra‑world situation, exposing its ontic uniqueness.